One False Step Read online

   Before trying to work out the puzzle, the manner in which crews were selected must be examined. The head of Flight Crew Operations, then-unflown astronaut Deke Slayton, believed that any astronaut could fly any mission, and ultimately selected on that basis – though he did try and match astronauts to suitable missions, and gave some regard to keeping 'buddies' like Pete Conrad and Dick Gordon together where he could. One rule that proved almost ironclad was the crew rotation system. A crew would serve as backup for a mission, wait out two, and then fly as the Prime Crew for that mission.

   The crew of Apollo 18 can be stated, then, with some certainty – the back-up crew to Apollo 15. This consisted of Dick Gordon as CMD (Mission Commander), Vance Brand as CMP (Command Module Pilot), and Harrison Schmitt as LMP (Lunar Module Pilot). As with all back-up crews, they trained as if they could potentially fly the mission at a moment's notice. In several cases, back-up crews had been called upon the fill this role; following the deaths of Elliot See and Charlie Bassett, the backup crew of Thomas Stafford and Gene Cernan flew Gemini 9, albeit with some months' notice. In the case of Apollo 13, CMP Ken Mattingly was switched with backup Jack Swigert with only a few days notice, when it was feared that he had contracted the measles. (Later, Deke Slayton would say he would not have made this decision again, opting instead to delay the flight.) Although obviously they had not trained for Apollo 18 itself, they had fully-trained for the similar 'J' class Apollo 15 mission, in which they had been noted to perform well as a backup crew.

   Dick Gordon was one of the more experienced astronauts as of his selection as backup commander; he had first flown as Pete Conrad's co-pilot on Gemini 11, setting what at the time was a new altitude record; subsequently, he had remained with his old room-mate on the backup crew for Apollo 9, before circling the Moon as CMP of Apollo 12. He had originally applied for the second group of astronauts, finally being selected for the third group a year later.

   Vance Brand would have been a rookie, but an experienced one. He had participated in the testing of the prototype Apollo Command Module, and served as a support crewman on Apollo 8 and Apollo 13, both eventful missions, but for very different reasons; known as a CSM specialist, he joined as part of the large fifth group of astronauts. Though he joined as a civilian test pilot from Lockheed, he had flown with the United States Marine Corps.

   The planned third crewman would have been the first of NASA's scientist-astronauts to fly into space, and the only one of the first group selected to have a realistic chance of walking on the Moon, geologist Harrison Schmitt. Almost since his selection in 1965, he had begun campaigning for a landing mission, trying to make himself a member of the astronaut fraternity; while other scientists had joined the program to fly in the space stations projected for Apollo Applications, he knew that his primary skills pointed him towards the Moon.

   This led to controversy when Apollo 18 was cancelled. The crew for Apollo 17, which would become the final flight to the Moon, had not been officially selected, though following the standard practice suggested that it would be the Apollo 14 backup crew – Gene Cernan, Ron Evans, and Joe Engle. All had performed well in training, but there was considerable pressure on Deke Slayton to select a different crew. Apollo 15 commander Dave Scott stated that he believed his backup crew was a superior choice, and should be picked to go to the Moon; the scientific community was up in arms when it appeared that none of the scientist-astronauts they had lobbied for would receive an lunar mission. Nevertheless, Slayton stuck to his rule, considering Joe Engle the best choice for a landing, and recommended the Cernan-Evans-Engle crew.

   This was rejected. The pressure from the scientific community had been just too much, and ultimately Joe Engle was dropped from the roster, switched with Schmitt. Upon his selection, Joe Engle had already had astronaut wings, having flown the X-15 rocketplane to the minimum altitude recognised by the Air Force as entering space, and he was known as a 'hot pilot'; but in this case, that was not enough. Had Apollo 18 flown, it is unquestionable that he would have stood beside Gene Cernan as the Apollo 17 lunar module descended to the moon.

   Although the ultimate backup crew to Apollo 16 would be pieced together from already-flown Apollo crewmen, and is therefore useless for the purpose of determining Apollo 19's crew, the original backup crew was somewhat different, consisting of Fred Haise as CMD, William Pogue as CMP, and Jerry Carr as LMP. Deke Slayton changed the backup crew as soon as it became apparent that they would have no further chance to walk on the moon, giving them an opportunity to find a new path into space in Skylab, though Fred Haise volunteered to remain as backup commander regardless.

   Fred Haise came close to being one of the first men to walk on the Moon; he was, for a time, assigned as LMP to the Apollo 8 backup crew, the crew that would cycle to Apollo 11; his reputation was as an expert on the Lunar Module. Though originally he was assigned to Apollo 14, he finished up as LMP on the ill-fated Apollo 13. Typically, it would be the CMP rather than LMP that would advance to the command of a mission (to provide an experienced astronaut who had yet to walk on the moon), but in the case of Fred Haise, Deke Slayton – and others – felt that he deserved another chance for a landing. (Had this taken place, he would have been the first Group 5 astronaut to command a mission.)

   William Pogue, selected in 1966, was one of the first of his group to be assigned to support work, working on the first successful manned Apollo flight, Apollo 7; he would later serve in a similar capacity on Apollo 11 and Apollo 14, both critical missions. A CMP specialist, he had served in the 'Thunderbirds' aerobatic squadron. Jerry Carr, a Marine pilot, was also one of the 1966 selection, focused from the start on duties connected with lunar operations; he served as a lunar module specialist, and worked on the development and testing of the lunar rover.

   This crew was dropped from the rotation fairly soon after it was announced, but they did participate in some training for the Apollo 16 flight, and all three were aware that they were scheduled to fly to the Moon as a crew – indeed, for more than a year it was thought that the last flight to the Moon would be Apollo 19, and there were some suggestions that a 'spectacular' might be arranged to round out the series.

   Apollo 20 is a far more difficult proposition. The backup crew for Apollo 17 was essentially the same as that used for Apollo 16, with John Young (Apollo 16 CMD) substituted for Fred Haise; this crew was never intended to walk on the Moon. It seems likely that the pattern of one experienced astronaut in the command slot, accompanied by two rookies from Group 5 would have been maintained; the remaining astronauts from the Group 4 selection were all targeted at Skylab, and none from later groups were considered truly eligible.

   One common name that appears to crop up in speculation over the composition of a crew is the CMP, Paul Weitz; the general assumption appears to be that this Command Module specialist would have been assigned to the crew; he had served on the support crew for Apollo 12.

   The LMP slot is less certain. Speculation at the time suggested the name of Jack Lousma, a lunar module specialist who had worked on the lunar rover with Jerry Carr; he was another experienced support crewman, who was the Capcom (capsule communicator) for the famous “Houston, we've had a problem” message from Apollo 13. He had received the early stages of lunar landing training. Some speculation suggests he may have been named as CMP, but this seems unlikely.

   Another potential candidate was Don Lind, a Group 5 astronaut who had applied for both Group 3 and Group 4; his qualifications suggested himself as both a pilot-astronaut, and a scientist-astronaut, and sending him to the Moon would have been the equivalent of despatching another scientist-astronaut. He had requested, and was receiving lunar landing training; Deke Slayton also considered him a strong candidate for a landing.

   The command slot could have gone one of two ways. Pete Conrad, commander of Apollo 12, and one of the most experienced astronauts, had lobbied for a second lunar landing until it became apparent that there would be
no opportunity for a second flight, whereupon he had elected to transfer instead to Skylab. Had Apollo 20 been green-lit, then it is possible he might have continued to push for a such a flight; though there were still many experienced astronauts who had yet to fly to the Moon.

   A more likely candidate, in line with the planned rotation, was Apollo 14 CSM Stu Roosa. A former 'smoke jumper' fighting fires for the U.S. Forest Service, he joined as one of the Group 5 astronauts, specialising in the command module; he was part of the support crew for Apollo 9, but flew on Apollo 14 without previously serving as a backup. Well regarded, he was a likely candidate for a command role.

   On balance, the crew in-line with the rotation – and hence most likely to be selected – would be Roosa-Weitz-Lousma; possibly Roosa-Weitz-Lind may have been considered as an alternate option. There was one potential spanner to be thrown into the works in the form of the man who made the decisions – Deke Slayton himself. By 1972 he was finally back on flight status, and eligible for assignment to a mission; he assigned himself to the first available flight, which would later prove to be Apollo-Soyuz.

   Had Apollo 20 remained on the schedule, the timing would have been right for him to lobby for assignment to that mission, presumably as its commander; potentially this could mean a crew of Slayton-Weitz-Lousma. When it came to Apollo-Soyuz, however, although Slayton flew, he did not fly as crew commander, this role instead going to Tom Stafford. It is not impossible that he would have found himself flying as LMP rather than CMD, making Roosa-Weitz-Slayton the Apollo 20 crew!

   Every astronaut suggested for possible assignment for Apollo 18, 19 or 20 would eventually fly in space, though some would have to wait a considerable time for their turn. Apollo 18 was the unluckiest; Dick Gordon left NASA in 1973, shortly after the cancellation of his mission, and Vance Brand would need to wait until Apollo-Soyuz in 1975 for his first flight, though he would eventually command the Shuttle. Joe Engle, who came closest to a lunar flight, was reportedly offered his choice of assignments – when offered Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz, or Shuttle, he selected the Shuttle, and was a key test pilot for that vehicle; he would later become the only man to manually fly the Shuttle through re-entry.

   From the potential Apollo 19 crew, Fred Haise moved to the Shuttle program, where he would serve in the early test flights, though he resigned from NASA before the Shuttle entered service. The remainder of the crew stayed together, forming with Ed Gibson the third Skylab crew; Jerry Carr would serve as commander of this record-breaking flight, the first time since the early days of Gemini that a 'rookie' astronaut would serve in this role.

   As for Apollo 20, Stu Roosa left NASA in the gap between Apollo and Shuttle; Jack Lousma flew as part of the second Skylab crew, and Paul Weitz in the first Skylab crew. Deke Slayton would finally get his flight into space in Apollo-Soyuz; Don Lind would have to wait the longest for his flight – but in the interim, he was named as a potential crewmember for a 'Skylab 5' mission, had it materialised, and was named as one of the two crewmembers on a 'Skylab Rescue' flight which was prepared after problems developed with the Apollo CSM used by the Skylab 3 crew.

   Given that these astronauts formed the bulk of the Skylab crews, there would have been a significant effect on those three missions; it would have been impractical to use any of the Moon-bound astronauts for Skylab, opening up four slots, including one for a commander. Whichever of the two had not flown on Apollo 20, Lousma or Lind, would certainly have flown to Skylab, possibly even as the commander of the last flight; Bruce McCandless, who in this scenario is the only remaining unflown Group 5 astronaut, would also have had a chance. Russell Schwieckart, who served as a backup crew commander for Skylab, was another possible choice; the remaining slot or slots would probably have been given to one of the Group 7 astronauts. Apollo-Soyuz would also have changed; Stafford-Slayton remains a probable bet; given the nature of the flight it would have been impolitic to use the former Air Force astronauts. One of the second group of scientist-astronauts, such as Joe Allen, might have had the opportunity to fly, or possibly a Group 5 astronaut would have been given a second mission.

   Of course, there were plans for additional follow-on missions after Apollo 20. It was never intended that this would be the end of America's explorations of the moon. In between the 'H' and 'J' missions came plans for an 'I' series of missions; these would not involve walking on the moon, but would instead consist of lunar orbital surveys, using the basic Apollo CSM (Command/Service Module) either operating alone, as was the case in Apollo 8, or using a modified version of the Lunar Module designed as an experiment carrier – similar to the plans for Skylab's ATM (Apollo Telescope Mount), which used the lunar module as a base.

   These missions had surveying as their primary objectives. The orbits of the moon on main-line Apollo were, due to the heavy payload being carried, limited to a narrow range of orbits; it was possible to place missions in orbits of higher inclination, allowing photographic surveys of areas not covered by Apollo or Lunar Orbiter flights. It was also hoped that metric and panoramic photographs of candidate landing sites could be obtained, to support later landings.

   The 'I' missions would have used much of the same improved equipment designed for the 'J' flights; these were a fairly early casualty of budget cutbacks. There were, however, some plans in 1971 to send Apollo 18 on a polar mapping mission, potentially after the conclusion of Skylab in 1974-75; this could have been a 28-day flight that would have allowed surveys across the entire moon under favourable lighting conditions; this plan never left the field of initial studies.

   A further possibility that was considered, but again never left the drawing board, was the 'Moonlab' concept – sending a 'wet laboratory' station into lunar orbit. This would have been a marginal mission for the payload, and would certainly have involved the construction of several more Saturn V launchers; the Saturn IB would not have been able to send astronauts to the station. Nevertheless, it could have remained in lunar orbit for considerably longer that Skylab remained in orbit around the Earth, and could therefore have proven useful for the support of later lunar logistic flights.

   What for the 'K' series of flights, following on from 'J'? Well, nothing was ever formally manifested for another series of flights, but there were many studies considered for the use of Apollo hardware in an expanded lunar exploration program. One key component would have been modifications to the lunar lander; Grumman had already enhanced it once to permit longer stay times and a greater payload, but they had plans to expand its capabilities once again.

   At the same time as the original proposals for an upgraded LM were plans for further developments, which could extend stay time to seven days, as well as carrying additional equipment for such a mission; it is fairly realistic to assume that this could have been adopted as a logical extension to the 'J' flights, forming a five-mission 'K' series for the 1974-75 period. An 'Augmented LM' was also proposed, which could have extended stay time to fourteen days; at this point, however, the problem of the CSM begins to arise; not only would modifications been required to provide it with an extended stay time, but a single astronaut would have remained on-board alone for fourteen days, presenting potential psychological problems. Plans were afoot for the creation of a 'Block III' CSM, and it can be assumed that an extended lunar program would have seen development funding to create this advanced Apollo design. (The 'Block I' was only used for Apollo 1, destroyed in the catastrophic fire that claimed the lives of three astronauts, and the 'Block II' was used in all manned Apollo missions.)

   Other proposals would have seen the development of an 'LM Shelter', essentially a short-stay lunar base, and a lighter 'LM Taxi' designed simply to transport astronauts to and from the shelter. Other lunar modules could have been used for unmanned logistic support. Ultimately, this could have evolved to support a lunar base in the 1980s, or possibly as early as 1978 in some studies. (Freeman Dyson has noted that had every other landing mission consisted of an unm
anned logistical support vehicle, it would have greatly increased the man-hours spent on the moon, and therefore the scientific return.)

   There were some basic flaws with the lunar module concept that were limiting, however. It required an Apollo CSM to deliver it to the moon, and would have required a Saturn V launch, and three astronauts, to simply deliver an unmanned logistic cargo to the moon. Long-term, the plans for extended-stay LM were logical enough, but using this concept for regular logistic support could prove cost-prohibitive. Further development of the moon into the 1980s would almost certainly have required some sort of basic redevelopment of the concept, perhaps a new capsule capable of landing a far larger payload on a one-way flight to the moon without astronaut support.

   Ultimately, although the Apollo program as conceived had limitations for lunar work, the missions as flown did not come close to pushing them. Certainly given that the launchers, far from being used for the support of Earth-orbital Apollo Applications flights as conceived, were simply left to lie around and rust (the most expensive garden ornaments in history), a way should have been found to fly at least Apollo 18 and 19; optionally one of these could have been employed for a lunar orbital mission. While there certainly were always risks inherent in these flights, there is a strong argument that the landing program was cancelled just as it was reaching operational maturity.

   Those who worked on the Apollo program, and the public in general, simply assumed that the landing flights would continue; even when the planned Apollo missions ended, something would take their place. In the 1960s, it was assumed that this would be the later Apollo Applications flights; even after Apollo 17, most assumed that NASA would return to the moon later in the century, with the Shuttle providing logistic support. But none of these flights were to materialise. And Harrison Schmitt remains the last man to walk on the moon...for now.